Judging the Judge:  Billy Budd  and  Proof to All Sophistries by Mailloux, Steven J.
Digital Commons@
Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School
English Faculty Works English
4-1-1989
Judging the Judge: "Billy Budd" and "Proof to All
Sophistries"
Steven J. Mailloux
Loyola Marymount University, Steven.Mailloux@lmu.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the English at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It
has been accepted for inclusion in English Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
 Judging the Judge:
 Billy Budd and
 'Proof to Ml Sophistries"
 Steven Mailloux
 In The Failure of the Word, Richard Weisberg addressed the
 most controversial question in the critical history of Melville's Billy
 Budd: How should we judge Captain Vere's decision to hang the
 Handsome Sailor?1 Weisberg develops his answer further in his paper
 for this symposium, "Accepting the Inside Narrator's Challenge: Billy
 Budd and the 'Legalistic' Reader." In both the book and the paper,
 Weisberg quotes what he calls "the central passage" for understanding
 Billy Budd. It reads in part: "Such events [as the Great Mutiny] cannot
 be ignored, but there is a considerate way of historically treating
 them."2 Weisberg claims that in this passage the narrator hopes "to
 educate us on theories of communication," and he goes on to use one
 such theory as the basis for his re-interpretation of Melville's story. In
 the following response to Professor Weisberg's paper, I address his
 two main points in using this theory of considerate communication:
 first, I discuss the theory as part of his specific reading of Vere's
 actions; and then I briefly examine the theory as part of a foundation
 alist project for grounding literary and legal interpretation in general.
 i
 By "considerate" communication, Weisberg thinks that
 Melville means communication characterized by covertness and
 deception. For Melville, this covertness is sometimes necessary, as
 when he suggests that certain truths can be told to unwilling readers
 only "covertly, and by snatches."3 But in Billy Budd, such considerate
 covertness is most often unnecessary and reprehensible, as in Clag
 gart's dealings with Billy. Weisberg accuses Vere of this negative form
 of considerate communication and argues that Melville wants us to see
 through Vere's distortions and lies in condemning Billy in the court
 scene. He goes on to show in great detail how Vere egregiously mis
 reads military law, and he claims Vere does this intentionally in order
 to justify7 hanging Billy. Weisberg argues further that there is a clear
 motive for Vere's unjust and illegal act: by executing Billy Budd, a
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 jealous Vere is symbolically killing Admiral Nelson, the national hero
 Vere can never become.
 I cannot examine here all the arguments Weisberg advances
 for this surprising interpretation, but I do want to introduce my main
 disagreement by mentioning at least a couple of my more local objec
 tions. For example, Weisberg gives much weight to the surgeon's
 reservations about Vere's behavior immediately before the trial scene.
 Yet he ignores the way the narrator undercuts our opinion of the sur
 geon in various places.4 Immediately after describing the surgeon's
 doubts about Vere's sanity, the narrator observes that "with sanity and
 insanity" to "draw the exact line of demarcation few will undertake"
 and adds: "though for a fee becoming considerate some professional
 experts will." The narrator then notes that the "surgeon professionally
 and privately surmised" just this demarcation in Vere's case (102, my
 emphasis). These comments and others raise questions about the reli
 ability of one of Weisberg's key witnesses.
 Weisberg goes on to claim that readers should notice Vere's
 distortions of the law in his trial speech against Billy. But he fails to
 mention the rhetorical fact that it was not the niceties of legal inter
 pretation, distorted or not, that convinced the court members to con
 demn Billy; it was Vere's straightforward appeal to their "instinct as
 sea officers," their worry over "the practical consequences to disci
 pline, considering the unconfirmed tone of the fleet at the time" if
 there were not a "prompt infliction of the penalty" for the "violent
 killing at sea of a superior in grade" (113, my emphasis). Rhetorical
 effect, not interpretive deception, seems to be the point here.
 I could continue this list of local objections to Weisberg's
 interpretive argument, but I do not want to give the impression of
 completely rejecting his negative evaluation of Vere's actions. I do
 want to suggest that the reasons Weisberg gives for condemning those
 actions are ? how should I put it? ? not well-considered.
 ii
 Not surprisingly, I have chosen a different passage than
 Weisberg's as my central text for interpreting Billy Budd. This passage
 appears in an earlier version of Chapter 7, where the narrator attempts
 to "fill out the sketch" of Vere by describing the Captain's reading
 habits. At one point in the late pencil stage of this passage, the manus
 cript took this form: in his reading, Vere "found confirmation ... so
 that as touching most fundamental topics there had got to be estab
 lished in him some positive conviction, which he forefelt would abide
 in him essentially unmodified proof to all sophistries" (313, emphasis
 added). If "considerate communication" is Professor Weisberg's key
 term, mine will turn out to be this phrase: "proof to all sophistries,"
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 which I will use first to reread Weisberg's interpretation and then
 center my own.
 Weisberg bases his interpretive case on the equation of "con
 siderate" with "covert" and "deceptive." But Melville's text gives us
 several other usages not covered by this equation. Besides Weisberg's
 key passage about "considerate ways of historically treating" mutinies,
 we read how for a "fee becoming considerate" so-called experts will
 draw the impossible boundary between sanity and insanity and how
 the court members were "considering the tone of the fleet" in making
 their decision. Earlier the narrator mentions that utilitarians "suggest
 considerations" implying criticism of Nelson, and in Nelson's defense,
 the narrator comments that "personal prudence, even when dictated
 by quite other than selfish considerations, surely is no special virtue in
 a military man" (57-58). In his trial speech condemning Billy, Vere
 himself asks, "[I]s nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be con
 sidered?" (110), and later charges the court to "consider the conse
 quences" of clemency (112). And still later in a defense of the court's
 actions, the narrator quotes an unnamed authority (probably Melville
 himself) "with respect to other emergencies involving considerations
 both practical and moral" (114). And, perhaps most ironically of all,
 considering Weisberg's view of Vere as a considerate communicator,
 we read that Vere seemed "unmindful" that his "remote allusions ...
 were altogether alien" to his fellow officers. "But considerateness in
 such matters is not easy to natures constituted like Captain Vere's" (63).
 My point here is a simple one: the word "considerate" and its
 variants do not just refer to covertness and deception in Melville's text.
 Rather, the terms refer more broadly to taking into account ?
 considering ? the many factors involved in any judgment, interpreta
 tion, or argument. Considerations are the multiple, messy, even in
 definable circumstances surrounding interpretive and rhetorical prac
 tices (including interpretations as rhetorical practices). That is,
 considerate communication involves adjustments to complex situa
 tions, with many considerations, interpreted to an audience. Consider
 ate communication deals with a multitude of considerations in trying
 to convince readers and listeners.
 Perhaps Vere does show himself to be a considerate com
 municator, not because he deceives the court, as Weisberg suggests,
 but because he convinces it. That is, Vere is a considerate communica
 tor not because he covertly misrepresents the law but rather because
 he explicitly and successfully appeals to the political considerations of
 the case. However, at another level, Vere is not considerate at all. He
 simply cannot cope with the multiple considerations in making judg
 ments, interpretations, and arguments case by case. And here I arrive
 at the center of my counter-interpretation of Vere's actions.
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 Captain Vere does not make his case to execute Billy because
 he wants to fulfill some kind of vendetta against Nelson, as Weisberg
 would have it. Vere does so because he cannot deal with the threat of
 political and intellectual chaos. Remember my key phrase: Vere
 wanted to have "positive convictions" safe from "all sophistries." He
 wanted absolute security invulnerable to the new and dangerous
 arguments of the French Revolution. Here is the final version of my
 key passage in the late pencil stage, the version that appears in all
 published forms of the novel: in his reading, Vere "found confirma
 tion ... which he had vainly sought in social converse, so that as
 touching most fundamental topics, there had got to be established in
 him some positive convictions which he forefelt would abide in him
 essentially unmodified ... His settled convictions were as a dike
 against those invading waters of novel opinion social, political, and
 otherwise, which carried away as in a torrent no few minds in those
 days" (62). Vere's was not to be one of those minds carried away by
 such radical sophistry; his was not to be one of those overwhelmed by
 alien considerations. What Vere wanted was a fixed point, principles,
 foundations to stand upon to fight the impending chaos of sophistry,
 of dangerous arguments.
 Such foundations give Vere the neutral ground from which to
 fight revolutionary ideas, or so he thinks. "While other members of
 that aristocracy to which by birth he belonged were incensed at the
 innovators mainly because their theories were inimical to the privi
 leged classes, Captain Vere disinterestedly opposed them not alone
 because they seemed to him insusceptible of embodiment in lasting
 institutions, but at war with the peace of the world and the true wel
 fare of mankind" (62-63, my emphasis). More pointedly, Melville had
 written in an earlier manuscript stage that Captain Vere "disinterest
 edly opposed the new theories not alone as impracticable but so far
 partaking of the unsound as to border on the insane" (313).
 If we return now to Vere's courtroom speech, we can see a
 reason for his argument entirely ignored by Weisberg: "[a]fter scan
 ning [the] faces [of the three court members] he stood less as muster
 ing his thoughts for expression than as one inly deliberating how best
 to put them to well-meaning men not intellectually mature, men with
 whom it was necessary to demonstrate certain principles that were
 axioms to himself (109).The narrator does not say that Vere wanted
 to convince the court of Billy's guilt but rather that he wanted "to
 demonstrate certain principles that were axioms to himself." He did
 not want to "kill" Nelson by hanging Billy but to fight disorder, intel
 lectual and political, by acting decisively to enforce and thus support
 stable principles of actions. "Certain principles that were axioms to
 himself" are the same as the "positive convictions" impregnable to
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 "all sophistry," the "settled" principles which were "a dike against
 those invading waters of novel opinion."
 From this perspective, then, Billy Budd does not present a
 conflict between good and evil, or between duty and compassion, or
 even between law and justice. Rather it enacts the conflict between the
 dangers of sophistry and the security of foundations: that perennial
 conflict, if you will, between rhetoric and philosophy. What the story
 and, in particular, Vere's dilemma demonstrate is that there is no sim
 ple way of deciding which considerations matter; no general princi
 ple, no rules, no theory applicable to all cases of interpreting and
 arguing distinctions between sanity and insanity, guilt and innocence,
 political duty and higher responsibility. In the messy world of inter
 pretive and rhetorical practices, one can, as Vere does, fall back on
 foundationalist thinking and try to avoid the potential dangers of
 sophistic rhetoric, or one can hire a paid expert, like the lawyers and
 doctors mentioned in the text, who will use sophistic rhetoric to argue
 for or against, depending on who pays. Neither remedy deals with the
 case at hand with all its considerations, Melville Seems to suggest.
 Neither Vere's intellectual security nor the experts' greed offer legiti
 mate motives for dealing with considerations of concrete historical
 problems of interpreting, judging, and arguing.
 m
 In my rhetorical reading, the lesson of Billy Budd must turn
 back, finally, upon the theories underlying any reading of Melville's
 text. Rhetorical (which is to say, political) considerations can never be
 escaped in interpreting law or literature. Rhetorical considerations are
 always historically specific, and thus general theories of interpretation
 attempting to provide permanent foundations for correct readings can
 never be effective except by accident. Professor Weisberg again pro
 vides me with my illustrative case.
 Weisberg presents his interpretation of Billy Budd as part of a
 general hermeneutics for reading literary texts, and in an article called
 "Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution," he
 attempts to extend his theoretical claims to legal as well as literary
 interpretation. In both cases, he aims to establish a foundationalist
 theory for guaranteeing valid interpretations.5 For example, in his
 paper he asks the question, "How is a text's general atmosphere and
 approach to be gleaned?", and he answers that a text can have in it its
 own "theory of interpretation." In Billy Budd he finds, as we have
 seen, a "theory of considerate communication," and he argues that the
 trial scene teaches us a methodology "to avoid interpretive error."
 Weisberg adds the traditional objectivist exhortation: "[ejngage the
 text in its fullness, avoiding no hint, embracing each nuance." But
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 whose fullness? Which fullness? Weisberg could answer: the fullness
 dictated by the text's own theory of interpretation. But don't we have
 to interpret the text first to find the theory for interpreting the text?
 Isn't this viciously circular? Moreover, I claim to have found a "theory"
 in Billy Budd myself (one that looks suspiciously like the rhetorical
 hermeneutics I have argued for elsewhere6), and my interpretation,
 the theory I have "found," is very different from Weisberg's.
 We seem to be left with the same situation with which we
 started: we still need to interpret the text and argue our cases. Furth
 ermore, no foundationalist appeal to "neutral principles" or "discipli
 nary rules" outside the text will change this rhetorical situation.7 That
 is, neither Weisberg's claims about a text's theory nor the more usual
 foundationalist appeal to sanctioned rules provides an easy escape
 from specific rhetorical contexts of interpretive argument. In every
 case, the text or rules must be interpreted and the interpretation
 defended. Along with Captain Vere, we may desire "certain principles"
 that are "proof to all sophistries," but no hermeneutic theory will pro
 vide them for us.
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